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Unlike regular cars, flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) allow motorists to fuel on motor
blends that contain between zero and one hundred percent of ethanol. This paper
investigates how motorists arbitrage between hydrous ethanol and gasoline using
aggregate fuel consumption data in Brazil. The ability of FFV motorists to arbi-
trage between fuel blends shapes of aggregate demands for hydrous ethanol and
gasoline. I estimate using nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions the demands
for hydrous ethanol and gasoline in Brazil, and motorists preferences for hydrous
ethanol. I find that on average, accounting for the relative energy contents of the
two fuels, FFV motorists in Brazil slightly discount hydrous ethanol over gasoline.
Most consumers switch between fuels when their relative prices are at near parity.
I find that 20% of consumers still purchase hydrous ethanol when its price is about
10% above the price of gasoline. The distribution of preferences is not symmetric
as 20% of consumers still purchase gasoline when there is a 15% discount on the
price of hydrous ethanol.
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Energy policies in the United States and Brazil encourage the production of ethanol
and its use in motor vehicles. Motivations for the adoption of these policies are
numerous and include energy independence, farm income support and reducing carbon
emission. Ethanol policies in the United States and Brazil have had significant impacts
on their respective energy sectors.
One outcome of energy policies in both countries is the emergence of Flex-
Fuel Vehicles (FFVs) that can run on fuel containing between zero and one hundred
percent ethanol. This is unlike conventional cars that can run only on fuel blends that
contain a low percentage of ethanol without causing damage to the fueling system and
the engine. In the United States, most gasoline contains ten percent ethanol (E10)
but other fuel blends with a higher ethanol content, such as E85, are also available.
In Brazil, gasoline contains between 18 and 25 percent ethanol (E18-25) and fueling
stations offer pure ethanol (E100) as well. In both countries, owners of FFVs can
arbitrage between fuel blends depending on which fuel blend offers energy at the
lowest cost.
When selecting a fuel for their vehicles, FFV owners may consider attributes
other than the energy content of different fuel blends. For instance, FFV motorists
may be willing to pay a premium for ethanol as they wish to support farmers or
because ethanol is more environmentally friendly than gasoline. On the opposite,
FFV owners may discount ethanol as it contains less energy per volume than gasoline,
thus requiring more frequent fueling.
Knowledge of consumers’ preferences for fuel blends is crucial in investigating
energy policies in both the United States and Brazil. In particular, the United States
is now hitting the so-called “blend wall”. The blend wall refers to the limit imposed
by the fact that most vehicles can run on fuel that contains no more than 10 percent
of ethanol. As the US mandate on ethanol blending is scheduled to exceed 10 percent
of the total consumption of fuel by cars in the United States, ethanol will have to be
1
distributed through other gasoline blends such as E85.1 The question is, what price
will clear the market for fuels that contain higher blends of ethanol?
Brazil consumers’ willingness to pay for ethanol is also important in investi-
gating the impact of US ethanol policies. By its design and given current ethanol
production capacities, US ethanol policies give rise to two-way trade between Brazil
and the United States (Babcock, Moreira, and Peng 2013). US ethanol mandates
differentiate between ethanol depending on the feedstock that it is produced from.
Imports from Brazil help meet mandates for advanced biofuels, which are not pro-
duced from corn-starch. At the same time, the United States ship ethanol produced
from corn-starch, responding to Brazil’s demand for ethanol, which does not discrim-
inate between the methods of production. Thus, an empirical description of Brazil’s
demand for ethanol, through understanding of Brazil FFV owners arbitrage between
fuel types, is critical to an analysis of US ethanol policies.
This paper estimates Brazil’s FFV owners preference for ethanol and gasoline.
Consumers preferences for ethanol an gasoline have been investigated before. Salvo
and Huse (2011) and Salvo and Huse (forthcoming) study willingness to pay for
ethanol in Brazil and Anderson (2012) investigates willingness to pay for ethanol in
Minnesota. This paper uses a panel of aggregate consumption and prices for ethanol
and gasoline by Brazil’ States. From a choice model of fuel, I derive expressions for
the aggregate demand for ethanol and gasoline. The data allow me to test whether
the distribution of willingness to pay has changed over time and whether consumers
in States that produce ethanol are willing to pay a premium to support local ethanol
production.
The next section provides background information regarding Brazil’s ethanol
policies, technical information about the types motor fuel available in Brazil and
1There are other approaches to go over the blend wall, including the use of accumulated RINs and
the blending of advanced biofuels to substitute for ethanol produced under conventional methods.
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illustrations of the spatial heterogeneity in Brazil’s consumption and production of
ethanol. The section that follows reviews the literature. I then derive a model of fuel
choice and show expressions for the aggregate demand for ethanol and gasoline by
Brazilian consumers. The two sections that come next describe the empirical model
and the data. I follow by presenting and discussing estimation results and finally, I
conclude.
Background
Brazil federal government has intervened in the motor fuel market for several decades,
shaping the demand and the supply for gasoline and ethanol. This section provides a
brief overview of Brazil’s ethanol policy, describes the types of motor fuel and discuss
geographical heterogeneity in Brazil’s motor fuel market.
Overview of Brazil’s ethanol policy
Investments in ethanol production in Brazil dates back to the 1930s. Still, ethanol
remained a marginal share of automotive fuel consumption until the 1970s when the
increase in oil price spurn investment and further government intervention. In the
early 1970s, oil prices increased rapidly, threatening the ability of the military regime
to rule due to the fuel shortages, inflation, deficits, and diminishing currency reserves
(Martines-Filho, Burnquist, and Vian 2006). In addition to the rising oil prices, the
price of sugar, the main feedstock in Brazil ethanol production, began falling in 1975.
In response to the increase in the price of oil and decrease in the price of sugar,
the Brazilian government created in 1975 ProA´lcool. The stated objective of ProA´l-
cool was to stimulate domestic fuel supplies to reduce the reliance on imported oil.
In 1979, in response to the second oil shock, ProA´lcool began focusing on expanding
the demand for ethanol. The same year, cars running on ethanol only (E100 cars)
were introduced along with subsidies for the purchase of those cars. The incentives
included, reduced registration fees, tax credits for ethanol cars, and regulated ethanol
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prices that were capped at 65% of gas prices (Hira and de Oliveira 2009). Ethanol
car sales represented only 1% of total car sales in January of 1980 but 73% of all car
sales by December of 1980.
The growth of the ethanol market was stunted by the decline in oil prices
in the 1980s. In addition to falling oil prices, an increase in sugar prices increased
ethanol production costs (Hira and de Oliveira 2009). After the collapse of the ethanol
market, the Brazilian government ended its programs supporting the ethanol sector
in the early 1990s. The government then passed a law in 1993 requiring a gasoline
blend that contains a minimum quantity of ethanol per volume. In 2013, this gasoline
blend contains between 18-25% of ethanol.
In early 2000s, oil prices began to rise, bringing focus back to the ethanol
market. This led to the introduction of FFVs in 2003. Helped by tax credits for the
purchase of FFVs (Barros 2010), sales of FFVs surpassed the sales of gasoline vehicles
in Brazil soon after their introduction (Hira and de Oliveira 2009). Now about 90%
of new cars are FFVs and the number of FFVs even surpassed in 2012 the number
of cars that run on gasoline only (Unica 2013). Salvo and Huse (2011) note that the
share of FFVs has likely been growing faster in North/North-East States as car stocks
have been growing more rapidly in those States during the last decade. In contrast,
the share of E100 cars decreased from 15% in 2002 to 4% by the end of 2010 (Du and
Carriquiry 2013).
The government involvement in Brazil energy market extends as well into
the price of gasoline. The price of oil was officially deregulated in 2002. However,
Petrobras, a company owned in part by the federal government, still sets the price of
oil products periodically (Bank Central of Brazil 2008). The objective of this policy
if to limit the rate of inflation in Brazil.
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Types of motor fuel
Fuel policies in Brazil have created markets for various types of motor fuels. In
addition to ethanol and gasoline, some cars in Brazil can run on compressed natural
gas (CNG) or switch between gasoline and CNG or run on diesel. However, these
cars represent a small share of Brazil’s car fleet and will therefore be ignored in the
remainder of this paper.
The two main motor fuels in Brazil are hydrous ethanol and gasoline C. Hy-
drous ethanol, hereafter alcohol, is ethanol produced from distillation and contains
about 4 percent of water. Gasoline C is a mix of pure gasoline (gasoline A) and
anhydrous ethanol. The production of anhydrous ethanol requires the dehydration of
hydrous ethanol, which is costly but allows blending of ethanol into gasoline.
In 2013, the blending requirements for gasoline C, hereafter simply referred
to as gasoline, were bounded by regulation such that gasoline contains a minimum
of 18% ethanol and a maximum of 25% ethanol. The regulation allows for some
flexibility in adjusting the gasoline blend to respond to shocks on the ethanol market.
For instance, in 2010, ethanol content in gasoline were adjusted down after poor cane
sugar harvests, which cause higher prices for ethanol. Table 1 shows ethanol content
in Brazil since 2003.
Ethanol and gasoline do not contain the same energy content per volume. A
rule of thumb in Brazil is that ethanol contains about 70% of the energy of gasoline
(Barros 2010). The last column of table 1 shows how the relative energy content
of hydrous ethanol and gasoline varies given how much ethanol enters in gasoline.
Despite changes in the share of ethanol that enters into gasoline, the relative energy
content of the two fuels remained close to the 70% mark.
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Table 1. Anhydrous ethanol in gasoline and relative energy content
From to Share of ethanol Relative energy
January 1, 2003 April 30, 2003 20 0.691
May 1, 2003 February 28, 2006 25 0.704
March 1, 2006 November 20, 2006 20 0.691
November 21, 2006 May 30, 2007 23 0.700
June 1, 2007 January 31, 2010 25 0.704
February 1, 2010 April 30, 2010 20 0.691
May 1, 2010 September 30, 2011 25 0.704
October 1, 2011 - 20 0.691
Notes: The share of ethanol into gasoline is from section 2.2.2 in Barros (2010) and
from data on fuel consumption in Brazil compiled by Unica (2013). The relative
energy content is calculated by the author based on data from Empresa de Pesquisa
Energe´tica (2012). The ratio represents the relative energy of hydrous ethanol with
respect to gasoline C.
Spatial distribution of production and consumption of ethanol
Brazil is a large country that comprises 27 states which greatly differ in area, popula-
tion and wealth. Geography is an important factor in the development of Brazil and
impacts fuel production and consumption of motor fuel as distance affect the costs of
moving fuel from production centers to consumption areas.
The four panels in figure 1 show the geographical distribution of a) total
ethanol production per capita, b) alcohol consumption per capita, c) the ratio of
alcohol to gasoline prices and d) the consumption share of hydrous ethanol in motor
fuel.2 All prices are in 2002 Real ($R) per liter. The data are described in the data
section of the text.
Panel a) of figure 1 shows that the total production of ethanol (the sum of
hydrous and anhydrous ethanol) per capita. The production of ethanol is located in
areas with large sugarcane plantations. The coastal state of Sao Paulo is the largest
producer of ethanol and also the State with the largest population. States neighboring
2The consumption of alcohol here, of course, refers only to consumption of alcohol as a motor fuel
and not alcohol for human consumption.
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Figure 1. Ethanol market by States in 2011
7
Sao Paulo also have significant ethanol productions but smaller populations. Panel
b) of figure 1 shows that the consumption of alcohol per capita is concentrated in the
states producing ethanol.
Panel c) reports the ratio of the price of alcohol, corrected for its energy con-
tent relative to gasoline, and the price of gasoline. As such, prices are at parity
when the price ratio equals one. In States where the price ratio is below one, alcohol
is discounted relative to gasoline. On the opposite, if the price ratio is above one,
motorists pay a premium for alcohol. Alcohol is relatively less expensive in ethanol
producing States, reflecting the difference in cost of distributing ethanol in States
away from production areas. Ethanol producing States also tend to tax alcohol less
than non-producing States. The price ratio is above one in states away from ethanol
production. Alcohol is mostly transported by rail and roads with the largest trans-
portation costs for deliveries in Center-West region, away from the production center
in the Southeast (Valdes 2011). Panel d) of figure 1 shows that consumers that the
relative consumption of hydrous ethanol is largest in states producing ethanol, where
ethanol is relatively less expensive.
Figures 1 highlights geographical heterogeneity in Brazil’s ethanol market.
Although differences in consumers willingness to pay for ethanol might explain some
of that heterogeneity, the spatial distribution of prices suggest that distance from
production areas are an important factor. The empirical approach will use this het-
erogeneity to identify consumer willingness to pay for ethanol in Brazil.
Literature
The demand for fuel in Brazil has received much attention. Recent studies include
Iootty, Pinto, and Ebeling (2009) who use static and dynamic systems of equations
to estimate the demand gasoline, ethanol, diesel and compressed natural gas (CNG)
and de Freitas and Kaneko (2011) who emphasize on regional disparities in motor
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fuel demand. These two studies, and many others, that estimate demands for motor
fuel are related to this paper but however not directly relevant. The focus here is on
how consumers arbitrage between different types of fuel and that literature is rather
sparse.
A necessary conditions for consumers to be able to arbitrage between fuel types
in the short-run is that their vehicles can run on multiple types of fuel. Ferreira,
de Almeida Prado, and da Silveira (2009) highlight that condition in their model of
choice of motor fuel in the short-run and choice vehicle in the long-run. The authors
show that expectations regarding future price of alcohol and gasoline determine the
consumers’ choice of vehicle type in the long-run. The model predicts that in the
long-run that the prices of ethanol and gasoline should coincide, once accounting
for the energy difference of the two motor fuels. Ferreira, de Almeida Prado, and
da Silveira (2009) find strong evidence of cointegration between the prices of ethanol
and gasoline in Brazil. Du and Carriquiry (2013) reach a similar conclusion that
there is a long-run equilibrium between the prices of alcohol and gasoline in Brazil.
In response to a shock, the prices of alcohol and gasoline converge to their long-run
equilibrium in about three months.
Salvo and Huse (2011) describe a model where FFV motorists can arbitrage
between alcohol and gasoline. If consumers arbitrage between the two motor fuels
on the basis of the relative energy contents, the price of alcohol should be about
70% of the price of gasoline. However, as Salvo and Huse (2011) show, under certain
market conditions, such as high sugar prices prompting exports of sugar, equilibrium
prices may diverge from parity. Salvo and Huse (2011) show from estimates of the
volatility of relative motor fuel prices and from cointegration analysis that alcohol
and gasoline prices have been increasingly moving in step. These results reflect the
increased arbitrage ability of motorist from the growth in the penetration of FFVs.
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Preference for alcohol over gasoline may reflect factors other than the relative
energy content of the two types of fuel. Salvo and Huse (forthcoming) observe that
time costs, vehicle range, technological concerns, habits, environmental concerns and
home bias may affect preferences. As such, there is a distribution of consumers with
a range of valuation for alcohol and gasoline. To investigate those preferences, Salvo
and Huse (forthcoming) conduct a survey of Brazilian motorists. The authors find
that about 20% of motorists still purchase gasoline when the price of gasoline is 20%
above the parity price of alcohol. Symmetrically, there is roughly 20% of motorists
that still purchase alcohol when the price of alcohol is 20% above parity.
Preference of ethanol in the United States has also received some attention
from the literature. Anderson (2012) estimates preference for E85 in Minnesota.
Estimates show that the consumption of ethanol is sensitive to price as a $0.10 per
gallon increase in the price of E85 yields 12-16% decline in the consumption of E85.
Model
This section derives expression for aggregate demand for alcohol and gasoline. Salvo
and Huse (2011) and Du and Carriquiry (2013) both describe the demand for alco-
hol in a similar framework but do not consider heterogenous preferences. The choice
model in Salvo and Huse (forthcoming) considers that consumers may have heteroge-
nous preferences for fuels. However, the framework in Salvo and Huse (forthcoming)
is adapted to individual fuel consumption unlike this model that derives expressions
for aggregate demands.
The model builds on the assumption that consumers maximize utility for their
consumption of motor fuel and other goods. The outcome of the utility maximization
problem is that a consumer i demands a quantity
(1) qi = q(p j,zi|cari)
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of motor fuel of type j= a,g, where the subscript a stands for alcohol and the subscript
g stands for gasoline.3 The price and quantity of alcohol are measured in their gasoline
energy equivalent. The vector zi is other variables that affect the consumption of
motor fuel (e.g. income, location) and cari = {E100,FFV,gas} is the type of car
owned by consumer i.
Note that the model focuses on the short-run demands for motor fuels. More
precisely, the model does not include car purchase decisions, which effectively deter-
mine the ability of consumers in the long-run to arbitrage between fuels. The model
considers the car fleet as exogenous and that arbitrage between fuel types, if feasible,
is a short-run decision determined by relative fuel prices.
Alcohol demand by E100 cars
Cars that run exclusively on alcohol have been around since the beginning of the
1980s. Although the size of the fleet of E100 has long been declining, there is still a
non-negligible number of cars in Brazil that can run on alcohol only.
Denote by Na the number of consumers that own a E100 car. As these con-
sumers are constrained to purchase alcohol, the total consumption of alcohol by E100
cars is
(2) QE100a (Na, pa,z) = Naq(pa,z|E100).
That is, the demand for alcohol by E100 cars is an increasing function of the number
of E100 cars, a decreasing function of the price of alcohol and a function of other
variables that affect the demand for motor fuel. The price of gasoline does not appear
in (2) as owners of E100 cars are constrained into purchasing alcohol.
3To simplify the notation, I do not indicate time or location although they matter in the demand
for motor fuel.
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Alcohol and gasoline demands by FFVs
FFVs offer their owners the flexibility to purchase any fuel blend. Thus, owners of
FFVs can select a fuel based on relative prices and a quantity based on the price of
the selected fuel.
Owners of FFVs arbitrage between alcohol and gasoline depending on prices
and their preferences for the two types of fuel. Let me write that a FFV owner i
derives θia/pa in utility per unit of alcohol and derives θig/pg in utility per unit of
gasoline. That is, a FFV owner derives utility θi j for fuel j but discounts that utility
by dividing by the price pi j. Given the ability to arbitrage between fuel, the demand
by one FFV motorist is
(3) qi(pa, pg,zi|FFV,θi) =

qia > 0,qig = 0 if θi ≥ p;
qia = 0,qig > 0 if θi < p,
where θi ≡ θia/θig and p≡ pia/pig. Expression (3) says that a FFV owner purchases
alcohol if the utility of alcohol relative to the utility of gasoline is greater than the
relative prices of the motor fuels.
In aggregate, the demand for alcohol and gasoline by FFV owners will depend
on the prices of the two fuels, their relative prices, and the preferences of FFV owners
for the two fuels. Let the relative utility of motor fuel be distributed according to a
cumulative density function H(θ), a probability density function h(θ), on the interval
[0,∞). If θ = 0, this means that a motorist strictly prefers gasoline over alcohol. On
the opposite, if θ→∞, then a motorist strictly prefers alcohol over gasoline. Assuming
that owners of FFVs each have one car and that there N f owners of FFVs, the total
demand for alcohol by FFVs is
(4) QFFVa (N f , pa, pg,z) = N f
∫ ∞
p
q(pa,z|FFV )h(θ)dθ = (1−H(p))N f q(pa,z|FFV ).
Analogously, the total demand for gasoline by FFV owners
(5) QFFVg (N f , pa, pg,z) = N f
∫ p
0
q(pg,z|FFV )h(θ)dθ = H(p)N f q(pg,z|FFV ).
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That is, the total consumption of alcohol and gasoline by FFVs depend on the number
of FFVs, the price of alcohol, the price of gasoline, the relative prices of alcohol and
gasoline, variables that affect the demand for motor fuel, and the distribution of
consumers preference for alcohol and gasoline. I write that the total demand for fuel
by FFV owners is QFFV = QFFVa (N f , pa, pg,z)+QFFVg (N f , pa, pg,z).
As explained by Salvo and Huse (forthcoming), many factors explain motorists
willingness to pay for motor fuel. If those factors are not constant across States and
time, this means that the distribution of preference is a function of State specific
variables and time series variables. One example of such variable is the number of
FFVs. Flex cars have been available in Brazil car market since 2003. The early
buyers of FFVs might have been those that value the consumption of ethanol the
most. If true, the implication is that the distribution of the parameter θ is a function
of the number of FFVs N f and that the distribution function h(θ) shifts to the left
as the number of FFVs increases. Another possibility is that ethanol supporters
already owned a E100 car when FFVs first became available. In such a case, the
early adopters of FFVs were not ethanol lovers which means that the distribution of
preference for ethanol shifts to the right as ethanol lovers replace their E100 cars for
FFVs. The empirical model will verify the distribution of preference shifts over time
by adding a time trend to the estimation of the distribution of consumers preferences.
The empirical model will also verify if consumers in ethanol producing States pay a
premium for ethanol by adding ethanol production as an explanatory variable to the
distribution of preferences for alcohol versus gasoline.
Gasoline demand by gasoline cars
Like cars that run exclusively on alcohol, gasoline cars do not offer their owners the
flexibility to select among fuel types. The size of the gasoline car fleet has been
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diminishing both relative to the total size of the car fleet and in nominal value (Unica
2013).
The total consumption by gasoline cars is the product of the number of gasoline
cars Ng and the consumption of gasoline by individual cars:
(6) Qgasg (Ng, pg,z) = Ngq(pg,z|gas).
The demand by gasoline cars increases with the number of cars and decreases with
respect to the price of gasoline.
Total demand for alcohol and gasoline
The total demand for alcohol is the sum of the demand by E100 cars and FFVs
(7) Qa(Na,N f , pa, pg,z) = Naq(pa,z|E100)+(1−H(p))N f q(pa,z|FFV ).
That is, the demand for alcohol depends on the price of alcohol and its relative price
with respect to gasoline, the number of vehicles that can fuel on alcohol and on FFV
owners preference for ethanol. The demand for alcohol increases with respect to Na,
N f and pg by decreases with respect to pa.
Figure 2 illustrates the shapes of the demands for a) alcohol by E100 given in
expression (2), b) alcohol by FFVs given in expression (4), and c) alcohol by all cars
given in expression (7).
Panel b) of figure 2 shows the demand for alcohol by FFV owners for two
distributions of preferences for alcohol. In the first case, the thick black line, con-
sumers differ little in their preference for alcohol. As such, as the price of alcohol
is slightly above the price of gasoline, a few consumers begin switching to gasoline.
Then, with a small decrease in the price of alcohol, a large number of FFV owners
switch to gasoline. As the price ratio is slightly below one, then all FFV owners fill
their car using ethanol. This large change in consumption for a small change in price
is illustrated in panel b) and c) of figure 2 by the segment of the demand for alcohol
that relatively flat when the ratio of prices is near one.
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Note: The figure shows two cases for the preference for ethanol by FFV owners.
The continuous line shows a case where the range of valuation for alcohol is narrow.
The squared dots show a case where FFV owners have a wide range of valuation for
alcohol.
Figure 2. Shape of demand for alcohol
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In the second case, the red squares, consumers widely differ in their valuation
of ethanol. The squares in panel b) of figure 2 shows that at about a 35% premium for
alcohol, some FFV owners begin switching from gasoline to alcohol. The consumption
of alcohol then increases as the relative price of alcohol declines. It is not until there is
a 25% discount on alcohol that all FFV motorists purchase alcohol. Thus, the squares
in figure 2 show that the more consumers differ in their preference for ethanol, the
more the switch between motor fuels occurs slowly and appears smooth in a graph of
the total demand for alcohol.
The two cases illustrated in figure 2 assume that the mean willingness to pay
for ethanol equals one. If the mean willingness to pay is above, this implies that the
demand in panel b) of figure 2 would shift up and consumers would on average switch
fuel at a price ratio above one. On the opposite, if the mean willingness to pay is
below one, then consumers would on average switch fuel at a price ratio of less than
one.
The total demand for gasoline is the sum of the demand for gasoline by FFVs
and the demand by gasoline cars
(8) Qg(Na,N f , pa, pg,z) = Ngq(pg,z|gas)+H(p)N f q(pg,z|FFV ).
The demand for gasoline declines with respect to N f , pg but increases with respect
to Ng and pa. Note that the demand for gasoline with respect to the price ratio p
follows a pattern opposite of the one for alcohol illustrated in panel c) of figure 2. As
the price of alcohol increases relative to gasoline, FFVs owners shift to gasoline such
that the demand for gasoline increases.
Econometric model
Recall that the objective of this paper is to identify how FFV owners in Brazil ar-
bitrage between alcohol and gasoline. Expressions (7) and (8) show that the ability
of FFV owners arbitrage between motor fuels affects both the aggregate demand for
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alcohol and the aggregate demand for gasoline. As such, (7) and (8) form a system
of equations that can be used to estimate the distribution of consumers valuation of
alcohol.
The system of equations includes three demand expressions: the demand for
alcohol by E100, the demands for alcohol or gasoline by FFVs and the demand for
gasoline by gasoline cars. Even though there are more demand expressions to esti-
mate than there are equations, it is possible to identify parameters of each equations
through the non-linearity introduced by the distribution function H(p).
Let me begin by describing the cumulative density function for the preference
of consumers for motor fuel. Recall that the preference parameter θ is defined over
the positive interval. Consistently, the empirical model assumes that the preference
parameter for motor fuel is distributed according to a log-logistic distribution which
support is on the positive interval. The expression for the cumulative log-logistic
distribution is:
(9) H(p) = H(p;αkt ,β) =
pβ
αβkt + pβ
,
where αkt > 0 and β > 0. The parameter αkt is the median of the distribution func-
tion and therefore scales the distribution function. Note the subscripts k and t that
respectively denote State and time as the distribution of preference may shift through
space and time. The parameter β shapes the distribution function and is assumed
constant across States and time. For β> 1, the mode of the log-logistic distribution
function is greater than zero.
I model a shift in the distribution function through the parameter αkt . In
the first model, I assume that the median, and hence the mean, is constant such
that αkt = α. The second model allows for the population of FFV owners to shift
over time by adding a time trend to the mean such that αkt = α+ τ ∗Trendt . This
model captures a shift in the distribution of preference for alcohol in the population
of FFV motorists because early purchasers of FFVs might have been those that value
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ethanol the most or the least. The time trend captures other effects such as, for
example, learning by consumers of the relative energy content of the two types of
fuel. The third model accounts for ethnocentric preferences related to local ethanol
production. The median of the distribution thus shifts with respect to the total
ethanol production (the sum of hydrous and anhydrous ethanol production) per capita
such that αkt =α+τ∗Trendt +pi∗ production ethanolkt . The motivation for this model
is that consumers may value the purchase of ethanol to support local sugar cane
production and thus are willing to pay a premium for the purchase of alcohol. Adding
the production of ethanol should not cause a simultaneity bias because the production
of ethanol is located closed to sugar cane production areas, which is located in areas
with geo-climatic conditions favorable to sugar cane production. Thus, willingness to
pay for ethanol in a region should not cause ethanol production in the same region,
thus removing potential endogeneity issues with adding ethanol production in the
equations for the demands for alcohol and gasoline.
Heterogeneity in quantities and prices for gasoline and alcohol across States
and time allow for the estimation of the model. Heterogeneity across States is partic-
ularly important. Figure 1 shows that the production of ethanol is centered around
the State of Sao Paulo. The production of gasoline is located nearby as oil is exploited
of the Southeastern coast of Brazil. Thus, as the production of fuel is located in a
specific region of Brazil, the costs of distributing motor fuel differ across States be-
cause of transportation costs. As a result of these conditions on the supply of motor
fuels, there is heterogeneity in the prices of alcohol and gasoline, as well as their ratio.
It is the difference in relative prices across States from conditions on the supply that
allows for the estimation of consumers’ preferences for fuel. In each State, the market
clears where the marginal consumer is indifferent between ethanol and gasoline. As
relative prices differ across States, the data allow the estimation of the distribution of
preferences from the marginal consumer that clears the market at a given time and
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location. I discuss later in the text the potential endogeneity problem and how prices
are instrumented.
Consistent with the assumption that there is one FFV motorist that is just
indifferent between alcohol and gasoline, given prevailing prices, the demand equations
are expressed on a per capita basis. That is, all quantity variables that enter the
empirical model (consumption, car fleet and GDP) are measured on a per capita
basis. An advantage of this approach is that it implicitly accounts for changes in
population.
In the empirical model, the expressions for fuel demands all take the same
linear form. The demand for alcohol by E100 car in State k at time t is
(10) QE100akt = αa +βapakt + γa f leetkt +λa f leetkttrendkt + τatrendkt +ξaGDPkt +δ
′
aXkt,
where Xkt is a vector of control variables that include States fixed effects and monthly
dummies. Data on the number of E100 cars are not available. Instead, as proxies,
I use the total size of the car fleet, the product of the size of the car fleet and a
trend variable, and a trend. Together, variables for the car fleet, the trend and their
interaction control for changes in the size of the E100 car fleet as well as other factors
correlated with time. Overall, as the E100 car fleet has been declining, I expect the
total effect from these variables to be negative.
The demand for fuel by FFVs in State k at time t takes the same form as the
demand by E100 cars:
(11) Q f f vkt = α f +β f plkt + γ f f leetkt +λ f f leetkttrendkt + τ f trendkt +ξ fGDPkt +δ
′
fXkt,
where the subscript l on the price variable stands for either alcohol a or gasoline g
depending on the type of fuel that a FFV owner selects. That is, the expression for
the demand by FFV owners is the same for ethanol and gasoline, with no difference
in the coefficient for the price variable. The difference in the demand for the two
types of motor fuel is captured by the function H(p) that describes the distribution
of preference for alcohol and gasoline. Variables for the car fleet, the trend and their
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interaction control for changes in the size of the FFV car fleet as well as other factors
correlated with time. As the fleet of FFVs has been increasing, I expect the total
effect from these variables to be positive.
Lastly, the same variables enter linearly in the demand for gasoline by gasoline
cars in State k at time t:
(12) Qgaskt = αg +βgpgkt + γg f leetkt +λg f leetkttrendkt + τgtrendkt +ξgGDPkt +δ
′
gXkt.
Again, variables for the car fleet, the trend and their interaction are meant to control
for changes in the size of the gasoline car fleet as well as other factors correlated with
time. The fleet of gasoline cars , as well as the share of gasoline cars in the car fleet,
has been decreasing. Thus, I expect the total effect of the fleet size, the trend, and
their interaction, to be negative in the equation for the demand by gasoline cars.
Together, expressions (9)-(12) form all the building blocks to estimate the
system of demand in equations (7) and (8). I estimate these equations in a nonlinear
SUR framework, which allows for the identification of the parameters of the three
demand expressions and the distribution function H(p).
Identification
Prices and quantities of alcohol and gasoline in each State are determined by the
intersection of the supply and the demand. The potential for bias from endogenous
prices is non-negligible, especially from the price of alcohol. As Petrobras fixes the
price of gasoline, responding to governmental objectives that are difficult to define,
assuming that the price of gasoline is determined exogenously would be reasonable.
Still, I approach the endogeneity problem cautiously by instrumenting both the price
of alcohol and the price of gasoline.
I estimate the model using two-stage least-squares. I instrument prices by
interacting State dummies with fleet size, the product of fleet size and a trend, a
trend, GDP, monthly dummies, State total production of ethanol, the West Texas
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price of oil and the world price of sugar. That is, the first stage requires regressing
prices of alcohol and gasoline for each State individually.
The exogeneity assumption of fleet size and the production of ethanol is worth
discussing. When purchasing a vehicle, motorists factor in their expectation regarding
future gasoline and alcohol prices (Ferreira, de Almeida Prado, and da Silveira 2009).
However, at any given time, the price of gasoline and alcohol clears the market given
the short-run conditions on demand and supply. Thus, as the car fleet adjusts only
in the long-run, the size of the car fleet can be considered as exogenous in the short-
run. The production of ethanol within a State directly depends on the production
of sugar within that State. Sugar production responds to expectations regarding the
price of sugar, which is determined on the world market. As many plants can switch
production between ethanol and sugar depending on their relative prices, the price
of sugar determines how much ethanol is produced. In addition, within a crop year,
production of sugar is stochastic as sugar cane yields depend on weather conditions.
Thus, as production of ethanol responds to world price of sugar and that yields are
stochastic, it is reasonable to assume that the production of ethanol is exogenous to
gasoline and alcohol prices.
Data
The monthly data are from January 2002 to December 2012, for a total of 132 months,
and are collected for each of Brazil’s 27 States. After removing missing observations,
the dataset contains 3,310 observations, beginning in January 2002 and ending in
March 2012.
Monthly data on prices and consumption of alcohol and gasoline by States were
collected from ANP, the National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels
(ANP 2013).4 Consumption data are the monthly quantities of gasoline and alcohol
4Prices and consumption data were graciously provided by professors Luciano C. de Freitas and
Shinji Kaneko.
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sold within a State. The price data were collected by ANP auditing division through a
survey of fueling stations. The price data include the average price paid by motorists
for alcohol and gasoline, including taxes.
All prices and quantities of alcohol are reported in energy equivalent to gaso-
line. Equivalency is calculated by the author using information from Brazil’s Ministry
of Mines and Energy (page 216 in Empresa de Pesquisa Energe´tica 2012) and the share
of ethanol in gasoline reported in table 1.
Figure 3 shows time series by States for a) the price paid by consumers for
alcohol, b) the price paid for consumers for gasoline, c) the ratio of alcohol and
gasoline prices and d) the total consumption of ethanol per capita (hydrous and
anhydrous ethanol). Each gray line shows data for a States. All prices are in 2002 R$
as calculated using the CPI published by Brazil Central Bank (2013). In figure 3, the
thick black lines are the un-weighted averages across States and the dots emphasize
data for the State of Sao Paulo. Observe that, as figure 1 shows, Sao Paulo is quite
distinct from any other States.
The price of alcohol does not appear to follow any trend between 2002 and
2012. This contrasts with the price of gasoline that has been in constant decline since
2006. The decline reflects a general increase in prices while the price of gasoline has
been relatively constant in nominal value.5 The ratio of prices varies greatly across
States. Between 2002 and 2009, the relative prices of alcohol and gasoline have varied
around 1, with notable positive shocks to the ratio in 2003 and 2006. The price ratio
has increased starting in 2010 in response to the decline in the price gasoline. The
total consumption per capita of ethanol varies much by State. In some State, the
consumption per capita is near zero while in Sao Paulo it was more than 10 liters
between 2008 and 2011.
5Recall that the price of gasoline is set by Petrobras, which is largely controlled by Brazil federal
government.
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Notes: Each gray line shows data for a State. The price and the quantity of alcohol
are reported in energy equivalent unit to gasoline. The thick black lines are the un-
weighted averages across States and the dots emphasize data for the State of Sao
Paulo.
Figure 3. Prices and quantities of alcohol and gasoline by State
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Data on the total production of ethanol (hydrous and anhydrous) by State
are from the United Cane-Sugar Industry (Unica 2013). The production data are
expressed in liter per month by dividing annual production by 12. Annual production
is adjusted for the crop year according to the region of production.6
I obtained data on the car fleet by State from Denatran (2013), Brazil’s Na-
tional Department of Transportation. The data represent the monthly size of the
car fleet by State. The data do not distinguish cars by their fuel system. Data on
Brazil’s population by States are from Brazil’s Institute of Geography and Statistics
(IBGE 2013). Population data are only available on an annual basis for 2000, 2010
and 2012. I constructed monthly population data by assuming linear increase in pop-
ulation between 2000 and 2010 and between 2010 and 2012. I also obtained from
IBGE (2013) the monthly GDP per State. The GDP is expressed in real R$ using
the CPI published by Brazil Central Bank (2013).
The monthly price of sugar is from FAO (2013). This price is an index of the
international price of sugar compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations. The price of crude oil is the West Texas Intermediate 40 API,
Midland Texas as compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2013). The
price of oil is converted from US$ to R$ using the monthly exchange rate published
by Federal Reserve Bank of St-Louis (2013).
Results
I estimate the system of equations in (7) and (8) by non-linear least squares. I present
two sets of estimations. In the least-square (LS) estimates, I assume that all variables
are exogenous. In the two-stage least-square estimates (2SLS), I instrument the price
6Crop year pertains to the production of sugar cane, the feedstock in the production of ethanol.
In the Center-South, the crop covers the period from April to March of the following year. In the
North-East, the harvest period varies between States: from May to April for the States of Amazonas,
Bahia, Ceara´, Maranha˜o, Para´, Piau´ı and Tocantins, and from September to August to Alagoas,
Para´ıba, Pernambuco, Rio Grande North and Sergipe.
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of alcohol and the price of gasoline, and hence the ratio of prices, to control for
potential endogeneity problem.
Regression results
Table 2 shows coefficient estimates. The table excludes coefficients estimates for State
dummies and weekly dummies. Models numbered 1, 2 and 3 differ in the variables
they include in the distribution of consumers’ preference for alcohol.
In the interest of space, I will focus the discussion of the results on the coeffi-
cients for the price variable and for the coefficient of the distribution of preferences.
I will not discuss the statistical significance of the coefficients as the calculation of
the standard errors could be improved by calculating cluster standard errors that are
robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
The demands should slope down with respect to fuel prices. In the equation
for the demand for alcohol by E100 cars, the coefficient for alcohol takes positive and
negative values, but is very small when taking a positive value. This may reflect that
the fleet of E100 cars is composed of old vehicles and that these cars are a necessity
good. That is, these old cars are mostly owned by the least wealthy segment of
the population and respond to their minimal need for transportation. As such, the
demand for alcohol from these cars is very insensitive to changes in the price alcohol.
The demand by FFVs and the demand by gasoline car both respond negatively, as
expected, to an increase in the price of gasoline, or alcohol in the case of the demand
by FFVs.
Estimates between 10 and 17 for the parameter β say that the distribution of
preferences is bell-shaped. In model 1, the value of the parameter α is the median
of the distribution of preferences for ethanol. In both the LS and 2SLS estimates,
the median consumer discounts alcohol over gasoline as the value of α is below one.
The discount is larger in the 2SLS estimates at near 6%. In model 2, the median
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Table 2. Estimates of demands and preference distribution parameters
Model 1
(LS)
Model 2
(LS)
Model 3
(LS)
Model 1
(2SLS)
Model 2
(2SLS)
Model 3
(2SLS)
Demand by E100 cars
Intercept 1.234∗∗∗ 1.775∗∗∗ 1.730∗∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 2.021∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.144) (0.158) (0.359) (0.378) (0.371)
Alcohol price 0.0149 -0.273∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ 0.057 0.042 -0.008
(0.079) (0.047) (0.050) (0.151) (0.153) (0.152)
Fleet -0.084 -1.350∗∗∗ -1.048∗∗ -1.195 -1.285 -1.694∗
(0.540) (0.370) (0.355) (0.769) (0.753) (0.826)
Fleet*Trend 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.010
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Trend 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP -122.9∗∗∗ -121.7∗∗∗ -121.6∗∗∗ -210.5∗∗∗ -210.1∗∗∗ -211.4∗∗∗
(25.51) (20.56) (21.17) (34.25) (33.69) (33.98)
Demand by FFVs
Intercept 3.665∗∗∗ -0.720 0.311 2.682∗∗ 2.432∗ 1.252
(0.666) (1.111) (1.064) (0.991) (1.000) (1.117)
Fuel price -2.896∗∗∗ -1.100∗∗∗ -1.574∗∗∗ -3.323∗∗∗ -3.251∗∗∗ -2.898∗∗∗
(alcohol or gasoline) (0.224) (0.282) (0.268) (0.448) (0.450) (0.477)
Fleet -21.15∗∗∗ -15.92 -13.21 -14.86∗ -14.48∗ -9.703
(4.855) (9.007) (8.442) (6.659) (6.732) (7.905)
Fleet*Trend 0.310∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.046) (0.045) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Trend 0.010∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
GDP 393.9∗∗∗ 478.5∗∗∗ 490.5∗∗∗ 510.9∗∗∗ 517.8∗∗∗ 578.4∗∗∗
(67.49) (108.5) (104.4) (88.14) (88.53) (99.28)
Demand by gasoline cars
Intercept 13.07∗∗∗ 17.88∗∗∗ 16.74∗∗∗ 15.46∗∗∗ 15.71∗∗∗ 16.94∗∗∗
(0.633) (1.112) (1.049) (0.880) (0.879) (0.978)
Gasoline price -1.453∗∗∗ -3.504∗∗∗ -2.948∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗ -2.193∗∗∗ -2.588∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.306) (0.294) (0.391) (0.404) (0.426)
Fleet 15.91∗∗∗ 11.73 8.786 9.997 9.697 5.340
(4.280) (8.685) (8.014) (5.934) (6.023) (7.077)
Fleet*Trend -0.155∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗ -0.121∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗
(0.021) (0.043) (0.040) (0.031) (0.031) (0.036)
Trend 0.018∗∗∗ -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
GDP -225.7∗∗∗ -262.4∗ -286.4∗∗ -256.9∗∗∗ -261.9∗∗∗ -310.2∗∗∗
(58.00) (103.0) (97.41) (73.06) (73.93) (83.09)
Distribution of preferences
α 0.971∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011)
β 15.84∗∗∗ 16.80∗∗∗ 15.64∗∗∗ 11.56∗∗∗ 11.54∗∗∗ 10.18∗∗∗
(0.984) (1.155) (1.071) (1.031) (1.048) (1.050)
Trend 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.00005 0.0001
(0.00008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Production 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0008∗
of ethanol (0.0002) (0.0003)
R-squared
Alcohol equation 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.89
Gasoline equation 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
Number of observations 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,310 3,310
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The asterisk indicate statistical significance with ∗ p< 0.05,
∗∗ p< 0.01, ∗∗∗ p< 0.001. Standard errors should be taken cautiously as they could be improved by calculating cluster
standard errors that are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
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of the distribution shifts with respect to time. In the LS estimates, the value of α
declines when adding the trend. The positive coefficient for the trend implies than
between January 2002 and December 2011 (120 months), the median willingness to
pay for alcohol increase by FFV motorists increased by 0.24. Adding the trend to the
distribution of preferences has small effect on the 2SLS estimate of α. The coefficient
for the trend is small and implies that the median willingness to pay for alcohol
increased only by 0.006 between January 2002 and December 2011. The estimates
for the effect of within State production of ethanol are the same for the LS and the
2SLS estimates. The value of the coefficient is small. The State of Sao Paulo, a large
producer of ethanol, produced 30.56 liters of ethanol per capita in December 2011.
This means that the median consumer in Sao Paulo was willing to pay 0.02 more for
ethanol relative to gasoline compared to a the median consumer in a State with no
ethanol production.
Distribution of preferences for alcohol
Recall that, as illustrated in figure 2, the variance on the distribution of preferences
for alcohol determines the shape of the total demand for alcohol. The mean of the
distribution determines at what price ratio consumers on average switch between
fuels.
Table 3 summarizes estimates of the distribution of willingness to pay for
alcohol for the State of Sao Paulo in December 2011. At that time, Sao Paulo was the
third largest ethanol producing State on a per capita basis. Thus, as the coefficient for
production of ethanol is positive in model 3, the mean willingness to pay for ethanol
reported in table 3 is the third largest willingness to pay estimate among Brazil’s
States.
In least-squares model estimates, the mean willingness to pay is near one.
In contrast, the 2SLS estimates show that consumers on average tend to discount
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Table 3. Distribution of willingness to pay for alcohol
Model 1
(LS)
Model 2
(LS)
Model 3
(LS)
Model 1
(2SLS)
Model 2
(2SLS)
Model 3
(2SLS)
Mean 0.978 0.997 1.003 0.954 0.954 0.960
Standard deviation 0.113 0.108 0.117 0.152 0.152 0.174
Share premium 0.387 0.461 0.484 0.335 0.336 0.359
20% quantile 0.890 0.912 0.912 0.836 0.836 0.824
80% quantile 1.060 1.076 1.088 1.062 1.063 1.083
Notes: All values are calculated for the State of Sao Paulo in December 2011, assuming
that the price of gasoline is R$ 1.7 per liter and that the price of alcohol is R$ 1.7
per liter as well. The row labeled “Share premium” is the share of consumers that are
willing to pay a premium for alcohol.
alcohol by slightly more than 4% on average. Estimates of the standard deviation of
the distribution are larger in the 2SLS. Less than half of consumers are willing to pay
a premium for alcohol. Observe in model 3 of the least-squares estimates that even
though consumers on average value alcohol and gasoline the same, still less than half
of consumers are willing to pay premium for gasoline. In the 2SLS estimates of the
same model, about 34% of consumers are willing to pay a premium for ethanol.
Figure 4 shows graphs of the per capita demands for alcohol and gasoline in Sao
Paulo in December 2011 in function of the ratio of the price of alcohol and gasoline.
The figure uses the 2SLS estimate of model 3, which is the case where the standard
deviation of the distribution of preferences is the widest. Observe in panel a) of figure
4 that the demand for alcohol is smooth which suggests that FFV motorists switch
rather slowly from gasoline to alcohol as the price of alcohol declines relative to the
price of gasoline. Panel b) shows that the demand for gasoline increases as the ratio
of fuel prices increases. The figure shows that FFV motorists tend to switch slowly
from alcohol to gasoline as the relative price of alcohol increases.
My results show a much narrower distribution of preferences than what Salvo
and Huse (forthcoming) find. Salvo and Huse (forthcoming) find that about 20% of
motorists still purchase gasoline when the price of gasoline is 20% above the parity
28
Notes: The predicted demands are plotted using 2SLS estimates of model 3. The
prediction assumes that the price of gasoline is R$ 1.7 per liter.
Figure 4. Predicted per capita demands for alcohol and gasoline in the
State of Sao Paulo in December 2011
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price of alcohol. Symmetrically, there is roughly 20% of motorists that still purchase
alcohol when the price of ethanol is 20% above parity. My results shows that 20%
of consumers still purchase alcohol when its price is about 10% above the price of
gasoline. The distribution of preferences is not symmetric as 20% of consumers still
purchase gasoline when there is a 15% discount on the price of alcohol.
Summary and conclusion
The recent introduction of flex cars, that can run on fuel than contains a share between
zero and one of ethanol, is shaping the demand for ethanol and gasoline in the United
States and Brazil. Understanding the demand for fuel, as motorists are now able to
arbitrage between motor fuels with varying quantities of ethanol, is crucial for analysis
of energy policy in Brazil and the United States.
This paper describes the aggregate demand for alcohol (pure ethanol) and
gasoline in Brazil. The model shows how motorists switch between fuels, given relative
prices, depending on their preferences. If there is a small variance in motorists’
preferences, then most motorists switch fuel at around the average willingness to pay,
creating a flat segment in the aggregate demand for alcohol. Otherwise, if the variance
on the distribution of consumers is large, then aggregate demand for fuel is smoother,
without any apparent flat segment.
I estimate in a system of equations the demand for alcohol and gasoline in
Brazil, and FFV motorists preference for alcohol. I find that on average, FFV mo-
torists in Brazil slightly discount alcohol over gasoline, even when accounting for the
relative energy contents of the two fuels. That is, most motorists switch between fuels
when their relative prices are slightly below one. I find that 20% of consumers still
purchase alcohol when its price is about 10% above the price of gasoline. The dis-
tribution of preferences is not symmetric as 20% of consumers still purchase gasoline
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when there is a 15% discount on the price of alcohol. This is a narrower distribution
of preference for alcohol then what Salvo and Huse (forthcoming) find.
This paper is an early effort in estimating the FFV motorists in Brazil pref-
erences for alcohol and gasoline and motor fuel. Future work will estimate cluster
standard errors that are robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Upcoming
work will show estimates of demand elasticities derived from the model. In addition,
I will derive an estimate of the demand for alcohol for all of Brazil. This demand will
use the bases for fuel prices across States to plot a demand curve that is conditional
on the price observed in Sao Paulo. In this aggregate demand, I do not expect to
observe much flattening of the demand at near parity for the price of alcohol and
gasoline. The reason is that the price bases for alcohol and gasoline may differ. As
such, in some States, the price ratio may be above one when the price ratio in Sao
Paulo is below one. The opposite case may occur as well. This implies that FFV
motorists across States will switch between motor fuel at a price ratio, measured in
Sao Paulo, that does not equal one, thus making the aggregate demand smoother.
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